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ABSTRACT
Modern-day zoos and aquariums market themselves as places of education and conservation. A recent
study conducted by the American Zoo and Aquarium Association (AZA) (Falk et al., 2007) is being widely
heralded as the first direct evidence that visits to zoos and aquariums produce long-term positive effects
on people’s attitudes toward other animals. In this paper, we address whether this conclusion is
warranted by analyzing the study’s methodological soundness. We conclude that Falk et al. (2007)
contains at least six major threats to methodological validity that undermine the authors’ conclusions.
There remains no compelling evidence for the claim that zoos and aquariums promote attitude change,
education, or interest in conservation in visitors, although further investigation of this possibility using
methodologically sophisticated designs is warranted.

Background
Displays of captive animals have existed since ancient times. Zoos and aquariums (which include marine
parks) were until recently generally accepted forms of entertainment, with little thought given to their
purpose or the trade-offs associated with the capture and confinement of animals. Since the 1970s,
however, public awareness of nature and environmental and conservation issues has come to the fore.
Many zoos and aquariums have responded to this shift in political winds by rebranding themselves as
agents for species preservation and public education.
Over the years a number of studies have yielded an incomplete understanding of the impact of zoos and
aquariums on educational and conservation-oriented objectives (see Dierking, Burtnyk, Buchner, & Falk,
2002, for a review). A recent study conducted by the American Zoo and Aquarium Association (AZA)
(Falk et al., 2007) titled “Why Zoos and Aquariums Matter: Assessing the Impact of a Visit to a Zoo or
Aquarium,” however, is being widely heralded as the first direct evidence that visits to zoos and
aquariums produce long-term positive effects on people’s attitudes toward other animals.

The AZA accredits, represents, and promotes 216 of America’s most prominent zoos and aquariums. Of
these members, a substantial number currently tout the findings of this study on their Web sites, including
the Monterey Bay Aquarium, the Naples Zoo (Naples, Florida), the Fresno Chaffee Zoo, the El Paso Zoo,
and many others. The press release quoted by most of these sites refers to the investigation as a
“groundbreaking study” and claims that “visiting accredited zoos and aquariums in North America has a
measurable impact on the conservation attitudes and understanding of adult visitors” (American Zoo and
Aquarium Association, 2006). It goes on to quote Cynthia Vernon, vice president of conservation
programs for the Monterey Bay Aquarium and an investigator on the study: “The Visitor Impact Study
shows that zoos and aquariums are enhancing public understanding of wildlife and the conservation of
the places animals live. It validates the idea that we are having a strong impact on our visitors” (American
Zoo and Aquarium Association, 2006). It further quotes AZA President and CEO Jim Maddy as asserting
that “For the first time we have reliable data validating the positive impact zoos and aquariums have in
changing visitors’ feelings and attitudes about conservation.” (American Zoo and Aquarium Association,
2006). As of May, 2009, the AZA report had been cited 10 times by various zoos and aquariums (Google
Scholar search, May 15, 2009) and yielded approximately 120 Web hits (Google Web search, May 15,
2009), virtually all of them providing laudatory coverage of the Falk et al. study.
For these reasons, the AZA report warrants particularly careful scrutiny. If the claims made on behalf of
many zoos and aquariums regarding the AZA report go beyond its findings, consumers of zoo and
aquarium Web sites and other promotional materials may come to misleading conclusions. Moreover, as
Mason (2000) notes, there is a marked dearth of information on the effects of zoos and aquariums on
visitors, making this report particularly noteworthy. Indeed, the questions addressed by Falk et al. are
undeniably important. Although our analysis will identify significant methodological weaknesses in the
AZA report, our intent is ultimately constructive. Specifically, we wish to use the AZA report as an object
lesson that may aid future researchers in this area in avoiding methodological pitfalls, some of which are
shared by other visitor research on zoos and aquariums.
The Falk et al. study comprised two phases. The first focused on the motivations that lead people to visit
zoos and aquariums, and the second attempted to measure changes in attitudes toward conservation as
a result of visiting the institutions. The study’s primary goal was to “assess the impact of a zoo and
aquarium visit on adults, as well as develop a set of tools that every institution could use for assessing
their conservation impact on visitors” (Falk et al., 2007, p. 6). Over three years, more than 5,500 visitors
and 12 zoos and aquariums participated in the study. On the basis of their findings, the authors
concluded that visits to zoos and aquariums have a measurable positive impact on the conservation
attitudes and understanding of adult visitors. In this article, we address whether this conclusion is
warranted by analyzing the study’s methodological soundness.
Analysis and Findings
The major hypothesis of Falk et al. is that zoos and aquariums have a positive impact on visitors’ feelings,
attitudes, and knowledge about conservation. They tested this hypothesis in Phase Two of the study,
which focused on measuring changes in visitors’ short- and long-term conservation-related knowledge
and attitudes. Falk et al. chose two zoos and two aquariums to “capture the most generalizable picture
possible of the conservation knowledge of zoo and aquarium visitors as they enter and as they exit, as
well as the responses, purposes, and general outcomes of their visit” (p. 8).
In this section, we examine whether this study was designed appropriately to address its central
hypothesis. Falk et al. draws strong conclusions based unequivocally on causality: they claim that visiting
zoos and aquariums has a measurable impact on visitor knowledge and attitudes. For this hypothesis-

based conclusion to be supported, Falk et al. would have needed to conduct a study that provided the
opportunity to adjudicate between empirical evidence for two hypotheses. In other words, a valid study
must be designed to provide evidence that disconfirms the hypothesis if it is false. Falsifiability is a sine
qua non of sound scientific research (Popper, 1959).
With these epistemic strictures in mind, we assessed the validity of Falk et al. according to standard
methodological criteria put forth by four well-established sources: Cook and Campbell (1979); Shadish,
Cook, and Campbell (2002); Kendall and Norton-Ford (1982); and Shaughnessy and Zechmeister (1994).
These sources describe a set of threats to validity that should be avoided in research. The presence of
even one major threat to validity can render a study’s findings difficult, or in some cases impossible, to
interpret.
Before describing each of the threats to validity that we identified in Falk et al., we should highlight a
major conceptual weakness of the study from the outset. The authors’ stated goal was to assess whether
zoo and aquarium experiences affect visitors’ beliefs and knowledge. With regard to knowledge, however,
Falk et al. assessed only what responders said they believed or understood; they administered no direct
measures of knowledge. There is a copious literature on the inaccuracies associated with self-report
measures. For instance, Ross (1989) cautioned that self-report instruments can be particularly
susceptible to the effects of implicit theories (personal narratives). In particular, he noted that if people
believe that their attitudes will change as the result of an experience or intervention, they may incorrectly
recall their initial (pre-experience or preintervention) attitudes as more different than they actually were.
Thus, without direct measures of knowledge changes, Falk et al. may at best have assessed what
responders believe they know or understand and not, as they claimed, what they actually know. Falk et
al. were presumably interested in the effects of zoo and aquarium visits on beliefs and knowledge
because these attitudinal changes may promote positive behavior in visitors. But they administered no
measures of behavior per se.
Setting this major weakness aside, we turn now to a detailed methodological examination of the validity of
Falk et al. Specifically, we pose the question: did Falk et al. adequately assess respondents’ reported
beliefs about their attitudes and knowledge? The main methodological threats to the validity of Falk et al.
concern poor experimental control. We identified seven independent threats to validity, which we outline
below (see Table 1). Most of these threats relate to either construct validity, that is, the soundness of the
measures as indicators of the constructs examined by the investigators, or internal validity, that is, the
soundness of the relationship between the variables under study. In the interests of brevity, we limit
ourselves here to the most serious threats to validity.
Nonrandom sample. Falk et al. relied on a nonrandom sampling of participants. They reported that they
used a “continual ask” method to minimize sample bias by approaching the first available visitor group
entering the facility, followed by the next, and so on. They maintained a refusal log to track visitors who
declined to participate. Nevertheless, they did not report any results from this log, making it impossible to
evaluate the characteristics of refusers and thereby evaluate the degree to which the sample was
representative. Because participants in this study were self-selected, they were quite probably
nonrandom. Although the researchers instructed the interviewers to be impartial in their interception of
visitors, they provided little detail regarding how objectivity was achieved or measured.
Nonspecific effects. Nonspecific effects are improvements arising from generic influences that are not
specific to the intended condition or primary variable under study and that can be caused by a wide
variety of other experiences. Zoo/aquarium experiences are designed to be stimulating and positive. They
include immersion in a sensory and physically engaging environment that includes many novel

components. Therefore, assessment of the experience is vulnerable to a host of nonspecific effects,
including novelty effects. Novelty effects are the general energizing and uplifting effects of a new, exciting
experience (Shadish et al., 2002). Falk et al. did not assess or control for novelty effects by comparing
their results with responses to other largely novel stimuli, such as new and exciting entertainment park
experiences that do not include animals. Therefore, novelty effects remain a viable explanation for their
results.
Table 1. Major Threats to Validity of Falk et al. (2007)
Validity Threat
Construct Validity
Nonspecific effects
Novelty
Construct confounding

Demand characteristics
Experimenter expectancy effects
Internal Validity
Nonrandom sampling
Response bias

Definition
The soundness of the measures as indicators of the
constructs purported to be examined by the
investigators
Improvements or changes from effects not specific to
the factor or treatment under study
General energizing and uplifting effects of a new,
exciting experience
Failure to take into account the fact that the experience
under study may include more than one component that
affects outcome
The tendency of participants to alter their responses in
accord with what they believe to be the researchers’
hypothesis
The tendency of investigators to unintentionally bias the
results in accordance with their hypotheses
The soundness of the relationship between the
variables under study
Unintentional sampling of subjects that introduces
systematic error or bias into the results
A bias in subject responding due to the test instrument
rather than the subjects’ actual beliefs

Construct confounding. Construct confounding occurs when there is a failure to take into account the fact
that the experience under study includes more than one component that affects outcome. The
zoo/aquarium experience consists of a complex assortment of components that include interaction with
other people, walking in an attractive indoor or outdoor environment, going to gift shops and food stands,
and often rides, tours, and other attractions. Even the experience of visiting individual animal displays is a
complex one that can be deconstructed into various components, such as interacting with a docent or
trainer, and walking through a physical display contrived to contain many components of “nature” such as
trees, boulders, and water. In the case of interactive animal displays and, particularly, swim programs in
aquariums, a multitude of salient components can contribute to participants’ overall responses (Marino &
Lilienfeld, 2007, 1998).
In the psychology literature, construct confounding is typically minimized or eliminated by dismantling
studies (Kazdin, 1994), which separate the potential effects of different treatment ingredients by creating
different experimental conditions containing these effects. Although there is no single, ideal control for the
zoo/aquarium experience, Falk et al. did not incorporate even minimally effective dismantling procedures
to address this issue.

Demand characteristics. One of the most common threats to validity is the presence of demand
characteristics, i.e., the tendency of participants to alter their responses in accord with what they believe
to be the researchers’ hypothesis. Zoo/aquarium experiences are contextualized as educational
experiences in obvious ways. Modern zoos/aquariums have recently shifted the strategy of marketing
their facilities as places of entertainment and amusement to marketing them as centers of education,
research, and conservation (Malamud, 1998).This new message saturates many elements of the
zoo/aquarium experience, including the appearance of animal displays, the kinds of items sold in gift
shops, the language used in display text and by docents and trainers, and the description of visitor
activities. For example, the Bronx Zoo, which was one of the participating facilities in Falk et al., refers on
its Web site to some of its displays as “living classrooms.” Another participating facility, the Binder Park
Zoo, introduced to their attractions a Conservation Carousel that featured a menagerie of crafted animals
that can be “sponsored,” claiming that “riders of the carousel will go a long way toward supporting the
Zoo’s conservation programs worldwide.” The Florida Aquarium in Tampa announced an event in which
the aquarium went “Green.” The obvious conservation and education messages associated with these
attractions make the intentions of the zoo, as well as those of the investigators, apparent to all who visit,
thereby imbuing Falk et al.’s study with the potential for demand characteristics that may undermine its
validity. Falk et al. neglected to guard against this problem; to the contrary, they informed visitors “fully
and accurately of the purpose of the study” (Visitor Evaluation Toolbox, p. 10) and, on p. 13 of the
Toolbox, instructed interviewers to “assure them [the visitors] that their participation will provide positive
and tangible benefits to future zoo or aquarium visitors.” These instructions render virtually all Falk et al.’s
findings potentially suspect. Furthermore, Falk et al. instructed interviewers to hand out tokens of
appreciation, in the form of small gifts, to participants. Evidence suggests that such tokens can produce
mild mood-elevating effects that, in turn, may bias ratings (Westerman et al., 1996).
Experimenter expectancy effects. Experimenter expectancy effects refer to the tendency of investigators
to bias the results unintentionally in accordance with their hypotheses. A large body of research shows
that experimenter expectancies can influence not only how subjects’ responses are coded and
interpreted, but even the responses themselves (Rosenthal, 1994). Because the surveyors who
administered the assessments to responders were aware of the desired outcome, the objectivity of the
scoring procedure in Falk et al. is suspect. In particular, the possibility of subtle and unintentional cueing
of subjects by surveyors is difficult to exclude. Falk et al. made no mention of efforts to mitigate this
potential problem. Furthermore, they offered little information about how they conducted the
assessments, such as where surveyors were standing and looking when the responders completed their
surveys. At the very least, potential experimenter expectancy effects could have been minimized by the
inclusion of raters blind or neutral to the hypothesis.
Response bias. Response bias can arise in several ways; for example, survey respondents may answer
questions in the way they think the questioner wants them to answer rather than according to their true
beliefs (see section on Demand characteristics). Such bias is especially likely if survey items are worded
to make one type of response inherently more likely than another, independent of their content. Falk et al.
determined the affective response of visitors with a 13-item, 7-point Likert-type exit survey (their Figure 1).
Two types of response bias to which this survey is susceptible are acquiescence bias and social
desirability bias (see Paulus, 1991). In acquiescence bias or “yeasaying,” respondents tend to agree with
survey statements, irrespective of their content. A review of the content of the Likert-type items in Falk et
al. reveals that only 2 of the 13 items were keyed negatively. The two items read, “I am part of the
problem with nature” and, “There is not much I can do to help nature.” The remainder of the items were
keyed positively, e.g., “I am part of the solution to nature’s problems”; “Animals are amazing”; and “Being
at the zoo/aquarium is fun.” Because most of the items were keyed in the same direction, the scale is
susceptible to a potential acquiescence response bias.

Social desirability bias is the inclination to present oneself in a manner that will be viewed favorably by
others. When social desirability cannot be eliminated, researchers often resort to administering an
independent scale that measures socially desirable responding, with the assumption that if a participant
answers in a socially desirable manner on that scale, they are in all likelihood answering similarly
throughout the study. In some cases, investigators then use scores on this scale as a moderator variable
or covariate in analyses (Piedmont, McCrae, Riemann, & Angleitner, 2000). There is no evidence that
Falk et al. employed safeguards against social desirability or that they prescreened items for high levels
of saturation with a social desirability dimension.
Weaknesses of the post-only, retrospective-pre design. Instead of an actual prepost (i.e., enter-exit)
survey, Falk et al. conducted their survey entirely on exit and asked visitors to reflect on how they would
have answered the same items on entrance (retrospective-pre). Their stated justification for this post-only,
retrospective-premeasure is that it provides a way to eliminate response-shift bias. Response-shift bias is
a change in the participant’s metric or context for answering questions from the pretest to the posttest that
confounds the apparent effects of the program or manipulation under study (Howard, 1980). The
retrospective-pre method is designed to mitigate response-shift bias by limiting participants’ responses to
the same time frame and context. But the retrospective-pre method is most useful in guarding against
response-shift bias when assessing changes in knowledge from training programs over a relatively long
period of time, not the effects of shorter-term general experiences on beliefs or affect, as was the case in
Falk et al.
Falk et al. contended that a post-only, retrospective-pre measure, which has been used by some other
researchers in this area, is more reliable than traditional pre/post measures for assessing attitudes. They
cited two studies to support this conclusion (Stevens & Lodl, 1999; Rockwell & Kohn, 1989). Neither
Rockwell and Kohn (1989) nor Stevens and Lodl (1999), however, reported a quantitative measure of
reliability in their evaluation of this method, so it is unclear on what basis Falk et al. advances this claim.
(Falk et al. reports a reliability (stability) coefficient of 0.842.) Moreover, although the traditional pre-post
method tends to underestimate program effect, the retrospective-pre measure tends to overestimate
program eff ect (Colosi & Dunifon, 2006).
In general, although the retrospective-pre method eliminates certain sources of error, it introduces others,
which are not dealt with by Falk et al. These include recall bias (the inability to accurately recall attitudes
held in the past), social desirability bias (described earlier), effort justification (the reporting of change to
justify time and energy invested in the experience), and cognitive dissonance (reporting improvement or
change, even if it did not occur, to ease internal conflict stemming from the expectation that changes
should have occurred).
None of these potential biasing effects were controlled or even evaluated by Falk et al.
Weaknesses of the long-term impact study. Falk et al. conducted a “long-term impact study” to assess
long-term changes in visitor attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions after the initial study. They collected e-mail
and phone information from participants. Due to low response rates, however, they were unable to obtain
a random sample of respondents. Out of 592 participants, only 84 completed the long-term interviews,
despite more than one attempt to contact some of the participants. The authors admitted that a valid
response rate could not be generated. Nevertheless, they did not report how responders differed from
nonresponders on potentially relevant variables. They designed “parallel assessment instruments”
comprising open-ended questions designed to probe visitors’ recall of the initial experience from 7-11
months earlier. Falk et al. reported that nearly all contactees recalled their experience. Most relevant to
the study’s aims, Falk et al. found that 61% conversed about what they had learned from their initial zoo

or aquarium visit. When asked what the zoo or aquarium hoped visitors would take away from their visit,
40% mentioned conservation and 66−76% mentioned that they believed zoos and aquariums played
important roles in conservation and education.
Falk et al. interpreted these findings as offering support for the education and conservation role of zoos
and aquariums over the long run. But the evaluation of this conclusion is weakened by several
methodological limitations. First, the relatively low rate of return on the long-term survey raises the
possibility that those who responded were unrepresentative of the entire sample. Because the authors did
not determine whether responders differed from nonresponders on potentially important variables, such
as initial attitudes toward zoos and aquariums, this possibility (known as subject mortality) cannot be
evaluated. This weakness only adds to the problems of nonrandom sampling in this study.
Second, it is well documented that memory is far more reconstructive than has traditionally been thought
(Loftus, 1993) and that retrospective reports are often of suspect validity. Ross (1989) reviewed the
literature on the effects of implicit theories on retrospective measures and concluded: “The biased
retrospections obtained in survey research may lead, among other things, to inaccurate conceptions of
human behavior” (p. 354). In an elegant series of studies, Ross (1989) showed that individuals in
treatment studies often unintentionally distort their memories of improvement on the basis of their
expectations concerning change. For example, if individuals expect to improve as a result of treatment
but experience no objective improvement, they will often recall their pre-treatment status to be worse than
it actually was (Conway & Ross, 1984). Th e same phenomenon could account for the reported results of
Falk et al., because responders might remember their previsit attitudes as less positive than their postvisit
attitudes.
Furthermore, Falk et al. never assessed or analyzed attitudes that might have worsened as a result of the
zoo and aquarium experience. Therefore, the proportion of participants who provided negative responses,
i.e., responses indicating that their zoo or aquarium visit was accompanied by a worsening of attitudes
about education and conservation, is not known. For example, Falk et al. did not include items assessing
the extent to which visitors view animals as objects of entertainment rather than conservation, a change
that many might view as negative. Instead, the authors appear to have assumed that all effects of zoo
and aquarium visits are necessarily positive, an assumption that does not appear warranted, given the
dearth of systematic data on these effects.
Interpretative issues. In addition to the major threats to validity already detailed, Falk et al.’s study was
compromised by a number of interpretative problems. The central weakness in Falk et al. is that the
authors repeatedly draw causal conclusions from data that are noncausal in nature. Their general
conclusion is that a visit to an accredited zoo or aquarium has a measurable impact on conservation
attitudes and understanding in adult visitors. For instance, Falk et al. states that “Our three-year visitor
impact study found that a visit to an accredited zoo or aquarium in North America has a measurable
impact on the conservation attitudes and understanding of adult visitors” (p. 9; emphasis added). This
statement implies that zoos and aquariums cause a change in visitors’ attitudes and understanding, even
though this statement is unwarranted, given the quasi-experimental (rather than experimental) nature of
their design. In fact, the authors make similar causal claims no fewer than nine separate times in their
report. As we noted earlier, because Falk et al. draws strong causal conclusions, their study can be
validly criticized on the basis of whether those conclusions are supported by methodologically sound
research. Had Falk et al. not drawn causal conclusions, there would have been little reason to discuss the
methodological weaknesses associated with threats to validity.

Finally, even putting aside all of these methodological threats to validity, it is sobering to note the actual
reported gains in stated visitor knowledge. Falk et al. finds that “there was no overall statistically
significant change in understanding seen” (p. 10). Therefore, the authors do not obtain strong supportive
evidence for their hypothesis because they found no significant gains in general knowledge from zoo or
aquarium visits. In response, Falk et al. speculate that their subjects might have gained more specific
knowledge of animals or conservation, a form of knowledge they neglected to measure. Yet, curiously,
they argue that “[i]f we had sought to measure this kind of knowledge, we very likely would have found
significant visitor gains” (p. 10). This kind of reasoning, referred to by Dawes (1994) as “an argument from
a vacuum,” is problematic, because it hinges on an unverifiable—and ultimately nonscientific—
assumption that changes would have been observed on dependent variables that were not measured. In
summary, our methodological analysis of Falk et al. shows that their primary findings and conclusions are
uninterpretable and unfounded.
Discussion and Conclusion
Falk et al. are to be applauded for examining an important issue that has heretofore received precious
little attention (Mason, 2000), namely the effects of zoos and aquariums on visitor knowledge and
attitudes. Nevertheless, despite the widespread acceptance of Falk et al.’s study by the zoo and
aquarium community, we have shown that numerous methodological weaknesses render their findings
difficult or even impossible to interpret. More important, their claims—extensively disseminated on zoo
and aquarium Web sites—greatly outstrip their methodologically limited findings. We therefore urge zoos
and aquariums to cease citing this study in their promotional materials as evidence that visitors’ attitudes
are changed for the better, as this conclusion is unwarranted and potentially misleading to consumers.
We also encourage further research that addresses the methodological threats to validity that we have
identified. In particular, we urge researchers to use designs that (a) incorporate appropriate comparison
groups of participants exposed to other forms of stimulating entertainment but not to zoos and aquariums,
(b) administer full pre-post assessments in both groups, (c) attempt to minimize experimenter expectancy
effects, ideally by using observers who are blind to hypotheses, (d) administer questionnaires that assess
actual knowledge in addition to beliefs and attitudes, attempt to control for response biases, and assess
potential worsening effects, and (e) conduct subsidiary analyses to examine the potential impact of
nonrepresentative sampling on the results. In this respect, our critique, although directed at one influential
study, may serve in part as a set of guidelines for future zoo and aquarium researchers for conducting
more internally valid research.
In summary, to date there is no compelling or even particularly suggestive evidence for the claim that
zoos and aquariums promote attitude change, education, and interest in conservation in visitors. Some
might contend that the methodologies used by Falk et al. are standard in a good deal of zoo and
aquarium visitor research. There may well be some truth to this assertion, but it does not gainsay our
methodological criticisms or imply that the flaws of their study need not be remedied in future zoo and
aquarium visitor research. Only well-controlled research, not enthusiastic assertions that outstrip the
quality of scientific evidence, can address the question of whether claims concerning the positive effects
of zoo and aquariums on visitors are justified. We encourage such research with a particular eye toward
remedying the methodological threats to validity we have identified.
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